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British Reaction to German Foreign Policy, January 1933 to June 1936

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JANUARY 1933 TO JUNE 1936

BY

NIGEL J. COX

ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in History in
the Graduate School, Eastern Illinois University

CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1980

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the foreign policy inter-action between Britain and Germany from January, 1933 to June, 1936, and to analyse British action, reaction and aims in foreign policy during that time.

In Chapter I, I deal with three broad ideas by way of introduction. First, there is an analysis of those groups which are acting and reacting in the sphere of foreign policy. There are four groups enumerated: the governmental or official group; the parliamentary group; the press; and, finally, public opinion. The make-up of these groups, the sources for discovering their reactions, and the problems with identifying their reactions is also discussed. Furthermore, it includes a summary of the attitudes of the press toward Germany in the 1930's and some of the personalities involved. Secondly, there is a discussion of the type of events to which these groups were reacting. There are three categories of events which are discussed: first, those moves which fall obviously into the category of foreign policy, like Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, or the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936; secondly, there are those decisions, like the reintroduction of conscription in Germany, which can be construed as domestic or foreign policy; thirdly, there are those events which, although exclusively domestic, elicited

a response in Britain. Finally, there is a short bibliographical review, in which the types of sources that were availabel to me and the problems with handling those sources is discussed.

The following four chapters deal with the actual events, from January, 1933 to June, 1936, which forms the bulk of the paper. Chapter II contains a background to the period under review in the form of a summary of British attitudes from 1919 to 1932, and continues with a description of Anglo-German relations in 1933. Chapters III, IV, and V deal with the events and reactions in 1934, 1935 and 1936 respectively.

The final chapter contains the conclusion, in which I trace the permanent aims and interests of British foreign policy and how these can be reconciled to British reactions to German foreign policy moves during the period under review.

I

There is a plethora of historical literature concerning European diplomacy during the inter-war period. Much of the material, however, concerns the years 1938 and 1939, and until recently the four or five years prior to that were not usually considered by students of appeasement except as a necessary background. Over the past ten years there has been an increasing interest in the 1920's and 30's as a whole in search of what one author calls The Roots of Appeasement.[1] There is little argument amongst scholars that the roots of what is called the British policy of appeasement are deep in the immediate post-war period. British reactions to German foreign policy moves in the late 1930's are anticipated by previous developments in the 1920's and early 30's, but the rise and accession to power of Hitler in 1933 fundamentally changed the framework in which foreign policy in Europe was being made. Although it can be argued that Britain did not really come to terms with this change until late in 1938, there is now strong evidence of an awareness of that change several years earlier. This study deals with the five years prior to 1938. Although there is more than a certain prescience of the dangers of Hitler's Germany exhibited in Britain, the following analysis in no way attempts to exonorate or condemn British appeasement of Germany,

but is an attempt to explain the reasons for British actions and reactions to German Foreign policy under Hitler.

Before any attempt can be made to analyse British foreign policy attitudes toward Germany it is necessary to provide some kind of framework for that analysis. The two most important theoretical questions to be considered are, first, who was acting and reacting in the realm of foreign policy; and secondly, upon which issues were they reacting.

When considering the problem of who was involved in the foreign policy process, there are four broad groups to be considered. First, and most important, is governmental, or official reaction. This includes the statements of both ministers and permanent civil servants or diplomats, as expressed in diplomatic documents, parliamentary statements and memoirs. Secondly, there are parliamentary reactions as expressed in parliamentary debate, public speeches and memoirs. Thirdly, there are press reactions, which are easily found in contemporary newspaper reports. Fourthly, there is the reaction of the general public, or the man in the street. The reaction of this last group is difficult to pinpoint since this is a period when public opinion polls were not widely used in Britain. For this reason, it is necessary to rely upon impressions, for the most part expressed in the other sources. These groups, it should be noted, are not mutually exclusive. That is to say that there is a great deal of interaction, particularly between the first three groups. The

"quality press", for example, not only reacted to foreign policy but helped to form it.[2]

Having listed these broad categories it is necessary to expand on their make-up and relative importance. In Britain the most important reaction in the foreign policy process comes from the "official" group. Britain is what D. C. Watt calls an "oligocratic society"--that is to say a society in which power is exercised by a few.[3] These "few", to be enumerated later, are "less responsible to and responsive to the main movements and currents of mass public opinion than their counterparts in other countries, and studies of such movements and currents do not necessarily have any bearing on the currents and movements of opinion among their ranks".[4] It should be noted, however, that there are exceptions to this general rule and the two most notable examples occur in the period under consideration. The first occasion in this period upon which public opinion affected foreign policy was in 1933. The East Fulham by-election of that year was won for the Labour Party, largely on a platform of disarmament. Thus when the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, was urged by the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, to press for speedy rearmament, "he [Baldwin] told him that he could not afford the risks. The British public, he knew, would have to be educated to accept that it [rearmament] was necessary."[5] Public opinion, then, as expressed so emphatically in the polling booths of East Fulham, had a clear influence on British

rearmament policy in 1933. The next incident was the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare in 1935. Hoare was Foreign Secretary at the time, and in an effort to solve the Abyssinian crisis suggested, in cooperation with his French counterpart, Pierre Laval, the partition of Abyssinia. When the Hoare-Laval plan was made public the adverse reaction forced Hoare's resignation.[6] These two incidents, however, are exceptions, and it would nevertheless be true to say that the direction of British foreign policy during the period 1933-37 was fashioned by an elite group.

The character of this elite group is two-fold. On the one hand there are those who made foreign policy, which can be divided into four categories: the political, the diplomatic, the bureaucratic and the military. This can be termed the "official" group. On the other hand there are those who sought to influence the making of foreign policy, that is to say, foreign policy discussion groups both inside and outside Parliament; the "quality press"; and finally the Crown and its advisors. As has already been noted there is interaction between the two sides of the elite. The press corps, for example, not only reported and interpreted foreign news and information which ministers used frequently, but also contributed to the general debate on foreign policy expecially as the originators of proposals and ideas.[7] A special note should be taken here also of the position of the Crown. Whilst it is almost impossible to assess with any certainty the position and influence of the Crown, it is equally certain that the

monarch is not without views on issues and that he makes them known to his government and others. The monarch is aware of his government's action through daily dispatches and weekly audiences with his Prime Minister at which opinions are exchanged. "The most plausible hypothesis is that which imputes the most influence to the Crown on issues on which the Cabinet is uncertain, divided or willing to be pushed. It is known, for example, that King George V was thoroughly in favour of good Anglo-American relations in the summer of 1921 when one section of his Cabinet bitterly resented American claims to naval parity with Britain."[8] In addition, there seems to be some evidence that Edward VIII, as Prince of Wales and later the Duke of Windsor, was sympathetic towards the Nazi regime, and the German government perceived the existence of a strong royal influence in certain cases.[9]

Whilst British official reaction was obviously the most important concern of the German foreign policy makers they also sought wider reactions than the purely governmental. These wider reactions can be gleaned from the British press. In contributing to the general debate on foreign policy, the press corps also helped influence German perception of British reaction to German foreign policy initiatives.[10] It should be noted, however, that whilst in some situations wider opinion as expressed in the press can affect the government, the government can similarly affect the wider opinion. This is clearly

acknowledged by the German Ambassador when just after German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, he warned that:

> The overall picture. . . recalls. . . in certain respects the situation as it was in 1914. Then, too, public opinion was at first inclined to be favourably disposed towards the Central Powers. The Sarajevo murder was universally condemned, and everyone agreed that Serbia thoroughly deserved exemplary punishment. When the storm clouds gathered menacingly, however, the picture quickly changed, and then transformed itself with astonishing speed into its exact opposite, into a picture, that is, of a suddenly united national front, standing with one accord behind its leaders.[11]

With this warning in mind, it would be useful to take a closer look at the British press in the 1930's. The Times, "whose editors over much of the [twentieth] century have broadly conceived it to be their duty to support the Government of the day, at least in the field of foreign affairs, and expound its views",[12] was under the editorship of Geoffrey Dawson. The Deputy Editor was Robert Barrington-Ward, who "by the spring of 1936. . . had become almost solely responsible for the treatment of Anglo-German relations."[13] Both Dawson and Barrington-Ward were pro-German and it was The Times' contention during the post-Versailles period that "justice did not become injustice because a dictator demanded it."[14] The Times' policy during the period under review can be described as pro-German, but it will become clear that it was not unreservedly so. Dawson summarized The Times' policy toward Germany in a letter to Anthony Winn, one-time Parliamentary Correspondent for The Times. He wrote:

> [The Times does not] cherish the smallest hope of a genuine friendship with the Nazi regime as it exists at present. Its hope, on the contrary, is of a genuine friendship with the German PEOPLE, whatever form of Government they may choose. . . .
>
> I do not myself believe that the system will last forever. But in any case I am convinced that the best way to consolidate and perpetuate it would be by staging a worldwide war on an issue that would be profoundly misinterpreted, not only in this country and in Germany, but in the dominions and the United States. Similarly, I am convinced that British rearmament and organization must go forward with redoubled vigour if we are ever to make the German people [my italics] cry halt to an insane competition.[15]

The subtle differentiation between government and people is one which is particularly important. It will be seen that whilst the Nazi regime was regarded with some suspicion in many quarters, it was felt that the German people had genuine grievances resulting from the Versailles Treaty.

The stance of the Manchester Guardian was similar to that of The Times. Whilst the politics of the Nazi regime were anathema to The Guardian, the grievances against Versailles which were a strong part of the Nazi platform were seen as just by W. P. Crozier, the editor of the paper. ". . . knowing what the Nazi regime and its ideas must lead to. . . [The Manchester Guardian] was unable conscientiously to oppose various demands based upon what it deemed genuine grievances in which Britain had complied at Versailles. . . ."[16] In 1935, Crozier wrote that:

> ". . . it simply won't do, in my opinion, to treat Germany as an outlaw, or a mad dog; she is entitled to have 'equality', whether she is run by Nazis or Communists or anyone else, and she has to be given the opportunity of coming into the pacts that are

> being made around her. It does not follow that this policy will succeed, but it seems to me to be the only course that is politically wise."[17]

It should be noted, however, that whilst backing certain of Germany's demands, The Guardian did condemn some internal policies of the Nazi Government--particularly the persecution of Jews and Christians, and the concentration camps.

The Times and The Manchester Guardian were probably the two most important of what can be termed 'the quality press', however, other newspapers must be considered.

The Daily Telegraph, which merged with the Morning Post in 1937, was a conservative and imperialist paper which supported the National Government. There was, however, considerable disagreement with the government on the correct treatment of Nazi Germany. The general line taken by the Daily Telegraph was that of Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, one which demanded a tough policy with no concessions to the Nazi regime. The Observer, a Sunday newspaper, under the editorship of J. L. Gavin, fundamentally believed that Germany wanted peace. Although not wholly in favour of some of the radical policies of the Nazi regime, Gavin clearly felt that an agreement with Germany was not only possible and desirable, but also of paramount importance. Running parallel to this advocacy of co-operation was an emphasis on the need for British rearmament. The Sunday Times was in a much more ambiguous position. Its owner, Lord Kemsley, was pro-Hitler and to some extent influenced his newspapers in this direction. The editor of the Sunday

Times was W. W. Hadley, and the editorial page supported the Government whilst favouring an Anglo-German settlement. The major spokesman on foreign affairs was Herbert Sidebotham, who signed himself "Scrutator", followed a most extreme line of appeasement. There were, therefore, three independent pulls of the Sunday Times which sometimes led to conflicting comments.

The popular press in the 1930's fell into two main groups--the Rothermere and Beaverbrook presses. Lord Rothermere, like Kemsley, was extremely pro-Hitler and strongly influenced his newspapers--the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror and the London Evening News. Lord Beaverbrook also influenced the policy of his newspapers, and in particular that of the Daily Express, however, he believed in the isolation of Britain from European affairs and stronger ties with the United States. To this end reports on European affiars were very limited. In addition to these two large newspaper groups there were two other newspapers to be considered--the News Chronicle and the Daily Herald. The News Chronicle maintained an anti-German stance, and was, in fact, the newspaper which most annoyed the German Government. The Daily Herald, the Labour Party newspaper, had considerable internal conflicts which diffused its comment on a variety of subjects including Germany. Since 1929 the majority of shares in the company were held by Odhams Press, which regarded the paper as a commercial concern; the paper, however, also felt responsibilities to

the Labour Party which was itself internally divided. The Daily Herald, therefore, took no really original stand on the German question.

Another part of the elite which sought to influence foreign policy was the parliamentary group. There are two main groups in this category which assumed broadly similar stances. First, there were some individuals in Parliament, that is to say elder statesmen, whose position of respect was such that they could have a profound effect on British policy. Probably the most important people in this group were Sir Austen Chamberlain and Lord David Cecil who both regarded Nazi Germany with some suspicion. It should be noted that the importance of these men was freely acknowledged by the Germans.[18] Secondly, there was a group of younger men headed by Winston Churchill, later joined by Anthony Eden after his resignation from the government. This group, which consistently advocated a hard-line policy with regard to Germany, was less influential, but its influence increased as the policy of appeasement began to fail.

Having briefly discussed the groups who were reacting to German foreign policy moves, and generally outlined their positions, I will now turn to the second problem--to what are those groups reacting. First, they are reacting to obvious foreign policy moves, that is to say, moves which involve other members of the international community. Actions in this category include Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, on October 14, 1933;

and the reoccupation of the Rhineland, on March 7, 1936, for example. Secondly, there are actions which less obviously fall into the category of foreign policy. When Germany reintroduced conscription on March 16, 1935, there were two interpretations of the move. On the one hand, the reintroduction of conscription can be regarded purely as a part of foreign policy, that is to say, it changed the nature of the German Armed Forces from a defensive force to an offensive force, and, therefore, broke the Treaty of Versailles. On the other hand, the move can be explained in domestic terms, in that by reintroducing conscription the employment situation was eased by taking away surplus labour from the job market. Furthermore, the service industries would receive a boost which in turn would stimulate the economy as a whole. It could be argued then, that the reintroduction of conscription was not a purely foreign policy move. Finally, there are some issues which are entirely domestic in character, but which, nevertheless, elicited some response from Britain. This is particularly true of the period, early in 1933, when the persecution of the Jews, Christians and Communists in Germany came in for criticism from some groups in Britain. Whilst the British Government maintained its traditional policy of non-interference in the domestic policy of another country unless British subjects were involved, there were groups who reacted strongly to the situation. Questions were raised in Parliament and criticism was expressed in the press (see infra). Furthermore, these criticisms

induced a response from the German Government, on the one hand expressed through diplomatic channels, and on the other by stepping up action against Jews. Thus, when considering the problem of what the British are reacting to in terms of German foreign policy, the broadest concept of foreign policy must be used, so that all German actions which elicited some kind of response in Britain are included in the analysis. Moves in all three categories elicited some kind of response from Britain, and, therefore, contributed to the formulation of British opinion vis-a-vis Germany.

Source material for this period falls into three main categories: the official; newspaper reports; and personal diaries and letters. In the official category there are again three categories, that is to say diplomatic documents, cabinet minutes, and the Parliamentary reports published as Hansard. I have been fortunate enough to have had access to all of these sources, but despite their indisputable accuracy there are some problems with each of these. Diplomatic documents rarely express opinion per se: the dispatches from Embassies are usually informational; the dispatches from the Foreign Office instructional. The position of individuals, therefore, only occasionally becomes explicit in these documents. For general reactions, then, and overall decisions the documents are vital, but for an indication of how decisions were reached they are not always too helpful. The Cabinet minutes, which should give a great

deal of insight into the decision-making process, are not verbatim accounts of Cabinet meetings, but reports. It has been claimed that the reports often have little relation to the discussions that went on at particular meetings,[19] and merely reflect the sense of the meeting. The reports of the debates in the House of Commons do give a good insight into dissenting opinion in the official world. Care, however, must be taken in assessing these reports. In an article in The Journal of Modern History, for example, R. H. Powers[20] compares Winston Churchill's statements both inside and outside the House of Commons with his voting record on foreign policy issues, concluding that although he spoke vehemently against a soft line with regard to Germany he did not reflect this in his voting in Parliament. This analysis, however, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the British Parliamentary system. Without going into great detail on practice and procedure in the House of Commons, it should be remembered that since the 1920's and 30's members of Parliament usually voted along strong party lines. Churchill's behaviour merely reflects a desire to maintain his party in power, that is to say he preferred to try to persuade the Government to change policy than actively aid its downfall. Therefore, more credence should be given to opinions expressed in speeches than opinions expressed in the division lobbies of the House of Commons.

Newspaper reports, and particularly editorial articles, provide an excellent source for reaction to German foreign

policy. Newspaper articles provide an immediate and accurate view of the attitude of that newspaper to events, and although attitudes may change the immediate reaction is important, especially in this study which attempts to plot any change in attitude. I have been fortunate to have access to The Times (London) for the whole of the period under review and to other newspapers for certain events, particularly the reoccupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936. I have also made great use of F. R. Gannon's book, The British Press and Germany 1936-1939,[21] which includes an excellent introduction to the whole period of this study.

Finally, amongst the contemporary sources, there are a number of collections of personal diaries and letters. Until recently, it was not usual to write a diary with view to publication, and, therefore, they tend not to have the distortion of hindsight from which some autobiographies suffer. There are two notable political diarists who cover the 1930's: Tom Jones,[22] an advisor to Lloyd-George and supporter of the National Government; and Harold Nicolson,[23] a backbench M.P. who supported the Conservative dominated National Government. Both men give excellent insight, not only to their own personal views on matters of relations with Germany, but also of more generally held attitudes toward Germany both insider and outside Parliament. In addition to Jones and Nicolson, there is a further important commentator of events, J. C. C. Davidson, an influential man in the Conservative Party administration, whose memoirs and papers are an important source.[24]

An additional primary source to be considered is autobiographies and memoirs. There is also an abundance of material in this category since everyone concerned--political leaders, backbenchers, career civil servants and diplomats, and journalists--wrote memoirs. The biggest problem with this kind of writing is that it tends to become a vehicle for ex post facto justification of action rather than an objective study of events. Although the actual course of events is never disputed, the changes of opinion are slurred or not admitted. Political memoirs tend to be least reliable in this respect, and Winston Churchill's memoir-history of the Second World War, although of prime importance, seems to degenerate into "I told you so" in the volume dealing with the pre-war years.[25] Anthony Eden's Facing the Dictators[26] suffers similarly, whilst Sir Robert Vansittart The Mist Procession, although reticent, tends to corroborate his sometimes vehement anti-Nazi feelings which are well documented elsewhere.[27] There is also a problem with this group of material inasmuch as those considered by history--both academic and popular--as appeasers seek to vindicate their actions in their autobiographies.[28] It would be wrong to ignore this source material but it should be treated with care in order that a more balanced view may be achieved.

There is a considerable amount of secondary source material which covers this period, from biographies to monographs. For many years there appeared to be fairly general agreement amongst historians as to the origins of and responsibilities for the outbreak of World War II. This unusual

homogeneity amongst historians has disappeared since 1960, and there are now two schools of thought which have been called the orthodox and revisionist.[29] The 'revisionist school' is led by A. J. P. Taylor, W. N. Medlicott and D. C. Watt, who have questioned the mutually dependent theses that, first, Hitler came to power with a set of long-term aims intent on achieving German hegemony in Europe; and secondly, that although upset by Hitler's initial actions, England was determined to take the nationalistic steam out of Hitler's policies by removing German grievances. Although it would be easy to completely ignore this problem of interpretation, since most of the attack on the 'orthodox' view relies upon economic considerations and internal conflicts in Germany[30] which are outside the scope of this study, the differing interpretations will encroach upon this thesis because the secondary sources do differ. Having noted that there will be differing interpretations in secondary sources, it would seem appropriate, whilst bearing them in mind, to set them to one side in the consideration of foreign policy.

II

There is a certain continuity to British foreign policy which derives from a number of geo-political considerations.[1] Probably the most important of these considerations is the fact that Britain is an island, dependent upon international trade to maintain its economy. This factor dictates that Britain, in general, favours the status quo or at least non-revolutionary change as being the most conducive atmosphere for international trade. The period between the two World Wars was no exception. On November 9, 1922, Lord Curzon, then the British Foreign Secretary, made a foreign policy statement in the House of Lords. In it he stated:

> [Britain has] always felt that the economic recovery of Germany was essential to Europe, and that she ought to be given a chance to regain her own equilibrium and self-respect. For this reason we have always been disposed to favour her admission to the League of Nations when she made application to do so.
>
> I certainly would not be a party to the evasion by Germany of just obligations. I would not favour her at the expense of our old Ally. I am still hopeful that we shall arrive at a solution by peaceful means and agreement, and I believe that any arbitrary measures would meet with failure.[2]

This speech clearly illustrates the feeling in Britain that Germany's recovery was linked to a general European recovery and, more particularly, the recovery of Britain. For the status quo to be restored, it was necessary for Germany to

re-enter the community of nations, to resume her place with the other powers. This was one of the most important factors which influenced Britain's attitude to Germany during the inter-war years. Another factor was a general feeling that the Versailles settlement was in some way misguided, even harsh. This feeling is reflected first in Keynes' polemic The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which appeared in 1921; it was reiterated in 1933 by Harold Nicolson in his book, Peacemaking 1919; and in R. B. McCullum's Public Opinion and the Last Peace which first appeared in 1944. It can also be seen in some of the first histories of the inter-war period, for example, E. H. Carr's International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939, which first appeared in 1947. Finally, there was a general loathing of war. The First World War was entered with a spirit of adventure and finished with a spirit of revulsion. It was a war to end wars, and there was a feeling that a similar catastrophe should be averted at all costs. These three factors, then, influenced British reaction to Germany during the inter-war period.

It was clearly seen that reparations would hinder German recovery, and Britain, therefore, did not back Belgium and France when they occupied the Ruhr in 1923, in an attempt to exact reparations. In fact, in February, 1923, Herbert Asquith stated in Parliament that "any steps that you [the government] take or propose must be of such a kind that whatever you ask or whatever you seek to enforce shall be such that it does not destroy, or even paralyse, the economic life

of Germany, and thereby undermine the whole fabric of international trade."[3] When the Dawes Plan was suggested in 1924, therefore, the British were eager to accept. The plan was an attempt to establish some stability in the German economy, and under it German reparation payments were rescheduled, a foreign loan was to be floated, and Germany was to be restored to full economic control of her whole territory. This plan can be seen as the first revision of the Versailles Treaty, and the first step towards restoring Germany to full membership in the international community.

The next step which augured the demise of Versailles was the Locarno Treaty of 1925, signed by Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy. Under the treaty, the Franco-German and the Belgo-German frontiers were guaranteed. The general implication of the treaty was that unless the obligations of Versailles were reinforced by voluntary negotiated treaties, they lacked binding force.[4] Locarno was followed by the Young Plan of 1929, which reduced reparation payments and revised the schedule for repayment. The plan was negotiated in conjunction with the proposed Allied evacuation of the Rhineland in 1930, some five years before the date set at Versailles, 1935. The international monetary crisis of the early 1930's, however, led to a declaration by Germany in 1931 that it could not resume reparation payments at that time, and implied that it would not be able to in the future. In January, 1932, the German Chancellor, Dr. Brüning, made the statement that "Germany was not in a position to pay

reparations now or at any foreseeable time in the future."[5] The diplomatic exchanges between Britain and Germany early in 1932, prior to the Lausanne Conference called to settle the reparation problem, strongly suggest that Britain was sympathetic to Germany's plight whilst not wishing to offend France.[6] At the Lausanne Conference, Britain acted as mediator between the French and the Germans, and a formula was drawn up in an effort to solve the problem of reparations payments in the context of the economic climate of the early 1930's. On July 12, the Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, said in Parliament:

> I make this claim: that the Conference and its results can lead to a settlement of this question of reparations which lies somewhere about the root of every economic trouble which has overtaken the world since the War, which has falsified national Budgets, has placed in the centre of Europe a country whose financial position is a menace to the whole world, and has done much to throw every national economy out of gear. While reparations last there can be no complete industrial recovery.[7]

The Times editorial of the same day fully endorsed the government stance over Lausanne, and the letters to the editor over the next few days further supported this view.[8] The British attitude at Lausanne can be seen as a continuation of previous policy. That is to say that Britain was trying to encourage the German economy and re-establish Germany in the international community, thereby restoring the international status quo in which atmosphere of stability it was hoped that British interest would flourish.

The next problem to be confronted was that of armaments. Part V of the Treaty of Versailles limited German armaments,

which "were imposed as a means of securing the peace of Europe."[9] There were, however, no such limitations on the victorious countries, and Germany felt this to be unjust and discriminatory treatment. In February, 1932, the Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva, and it was then that the Germans demanded equality of status. Whilst the British Government was sympathetic to what was considered a just grievance, there were two major stumbling blocks. First, the French felt that their demand for security would be jeopardized by the German demand for equality, and, secondly, it was feared that having achieved equality the Germans would proceed to settle certain territorial differences with Poland, an ally of France, by force. The success of the Lausanne Conference, which was conducted whilst the deadlock in Geneva continued, in September prompted the new German Government of Franz von Papen to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference until its demands were met. For the next few months some kind of formula to break the deadlock was sought. Britain was aware of "the sense of grievance on the side of Germany. . . [and was] ready and anxious to join the other Governments represented at Geneva in sincere and far-reaching steps to remove it."[10] At the same time, however, the British were aware of the problems that might arise, stating:

> It is not open to question that the hesitation which may have shown itself in certain quarters in granting the German claim does not proceed from any desire to inflict upon Germany a permanent inferiority of status, which her people would naturally resent, but from a deep anxiety as to the use which might be made of the new situation and of the dangers which would result to the tranquility of Europe if an express assurance as to the peaceful intentions of Germany was not forthcoming.

By December, worries seem to have been removed and a formula agreed upon for the re-entry of Germany into the Disarmament Conference. On December 11, an agreement was reached by Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the United States which stated that:

> The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy have declared that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Germany, and to the other Powers disarmed by treaty, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that the principle should find itself embodied in the convention containing the conclusions of the Disarmament Conference.[12]

During the 1920's and early 1930's then, with the general agreement and sympathy of the British governments, certain of what Germany regarded as inequitable parts of the Versailles Treaty were revised. This was even carried so far as the recognition, in principle, of Germany's right to equality of armaments. Germany was like any other nation-state, and as such had the same obligations as all other nation-states, under the Versailles Treaty it was denied the means to do this. Germany did not have full sovereignty over all its territory; and did not have the means to defend itself against possible aggression. It seemed only right, in British eyes, that Germany should, therefore, be restored the means to fulfill its functions as a nation-state, and conduct its affairs as an equal member of the international community. Furthermore, in its attempts to remove German grievances, Britain seemed happy to alter the provisions of the treaties made at Versailles.

Despite there being many concessions, there was a realisation that the rise of nationalistic forces--particularly of Hitler--could lead to serious problems in the future. On March 23, 1932, therefore, the 'ten year rule', which envisaged no major war for the next ten years, was abandoned by the Cabinet on the insistence of the Chiefs of Staff. Although this was partially due to the Manchurian Crisis, the rise of Hitler also played a major part in that decision.[13] By 1932, then, the British attitude to Germany was not unequivocal. That is to say that, whilst recognizing and wishing to remove just grievances, the British Government also recognized a possible German threat to international security.

Before moving on to an analysis of specific British reactions to German foreign policy during the period 1933-1936, it might be well to pause in order to outline the general position of the various groups to be considered by 1933, in order to illustrate more clearly what, if any, changes take place. The attitude of the British Government, as has been seen, was somewhat ambivalent. Whilst the governments, of whatever nature, were generally sympathetic to limited revisionism in order to remove the injustices of Versailles, they were also made aware, by 1932, of the dangers of a nationalistic government in Berlin. In Parliament, there were no clearly defined positions. The Conservatives followed their leaders' policies, with one or two notable exceptions like Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill, whose dissidence

became more important and influential over the few years before the war. The Liberals were on the whole sympathetic to the kind of limited revisionism that the Government proposed, and the Labour Party followed a similar line. In fact, the Labour M.P.'s main foreign policy ideas rested upon disarmament and peaceful solution of international differences. Clem Attlee, who was elected Labour Leader in 1935, wrote:

> It is, I think, fair to say that until 1935 the Parliamentary Labour Party had given little or no serious attention to defence problems. The party had held office in a minority government on two occasions . . . when it had been laid down that there was no danger of war for ten years. There were, indeed, no potentially hostile powers of any military strength, while, at the League of Nations, all the emphasis was on disarmament. In these circumstances, it was natural that no consideration should be given to technical problems of defence.[14]

Other than a routine vote against Service Estimates, therefore, the Labour Party gave little serious attention to international relations and defence. The press, in general supported the government of the day. They shared the feeling of the injustices of Versailles, and a feeling of sympathy for Germany, but at the same time were aware of the problems that could be created by a resurgent Germany. There was, however, one strong dissident voice. Winston Churchill was strongly opposed to the decisions of the Lausanne Conference and the recognition of Germany's right to equality of armaments. On July 11, Churchill made a strong statement in Parliament on the question of reparations and the Lausanne Conference.[15] In November, he raised the question of armaments, stating:

> Do not delude yourselves. Do not let His Majesty's Government believe. . . that all Germany is asking for is equal status. . . . That is not what Germany is seeking. All these bands of sturdy Teutonic youths, marching through the streets and roads of Germany. . . are not looking for status. They are looking for weapons, and, when they have the weapons, believe me they will then ask for the return of lost territories and lost colonies. . . .[16]

Churchill's opinion, however, was not widely held. The general public, if various analyses are to be believed,[17] shared the sympathy of the other groups, and seemed much influenced by them in their reaction to Germany.

On January 30, 1933, Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany. Initially, his coming to power gave little rise to concern. This is generally reflected by Sir Harold Rumbold, the British Ambassador in Berlin, in his report on the situation in Germany. He stated that:

> . . . the President seems to have followed constitutional procedure in entrusting Hitler, as leader of the strongest party in the Reichstag, with the Chancellorship. . .
>
> 2. That Hitler should, contrary to his repeated asseverations in the past, have consented to accept the Chancellorship without insisting on his claim to exclusive power, can perhaps only be explained by a tardy realisation of the difficulties of his own position. . . .
>
> 6. It will probably be necessary to await the statement of the Government programme in the Reichstag, in order to learn the lines along which the Hitler Government propose to conduct their internal and foreign policy.[18]

Parliament was not in session at this time and the Cabinet was meeting to discuss other more pressing internal matters, so the only official reaction comes from this telegram. From this evidence, Hitler is regarded as an ordinary politician,

seeking power by the usual means. The 'wait and see' attitude, however, does imply some reservations. The press also reflect this view. In The Times editorial of January 31, it was stated:

> That Herr Hitler, who leads the strongest party in the Reichstag and obtained almost a third of more than 35,000,000 votes in the last election, should be given the chance of showing that he is something more than an orator and agitator was always desirable . . . . In this country. . . as in France, the effect of the change of Government on the German attitude toward armaments will be watched with some misgivings. But in fairness to the Nazis, it must be admitted that they have in fact said little more on the subject of German disabilities under the Treaty of Versailles than the most constitutional German parties. . . .
>
> But in the last resort, the future of German Parliamentarianism appears to depend mainly upon the unknown quantity of Herr Hitler's constructive powers, and of his ability for the first time to exercise power with responsibility.[19]

To this calm acceptance with reservations must be added the view that Hitler's power was tempered and controlled by other elements inside and oustide the Reichstag, and could be transitory. The Economist editorialized, characterizing the German people as a horse:

> Herr Hitler has been hoist into the saddle. It is now to beseen if he can keep his seat, with Freiherr von Papen perched on the crupper behind him and digging in his East-Prussian spurs. . . what will the creature feel like now, when Hitler cracks his whip and Von Papen applies his spurs. . . with Hugenberg (The Nationalist Leader) running behind and twisting his tail. . . . Will the poor animal make a frantic effort and impale himself on the spikes? Or will he wildly plunge and rear and throw his riders. . . ?[20]

There is some concern expressed in the article, however, it is felt that Hitler, brought to power by the same configuration of pressure groups which had established and overthrown

two previous governments, might only hold power for a short period. It is noted in the article, however, that the Junkers may have unleased something which they would not be able to control. Typical of this calm yet concerned attitude was the opinion expressed in a letter to Thomas Jones, an important member of the Conservative Party: "Germany I cannot understand. . . My last informant tells me that von Papen is a far more sinister figure than Hitler, for Hitler will turn out to have no plans, whereas von Papen has a very definite one." The writer goes on to echo ideas about the injustice of Versailles, writing: "The responsibility for Germany's plight today lies upon those who made the Treaty of Versailles--England, France and President Wilson. If they had pursued the policy which Wellington pursued after Waterloo, the moderates would have, in my judgment, permanently controlled."[21]

This measured response was not universal. Again Winston Churchill saw some danger in the events in Germany. The only evidence for this is his retrospective history of the war, however, it seems valid since his public statements before and after the event support this view. Calling these events "deadly changes," he paints a vivid picture of the potential dangers he foresaw after Hitler's accession to power, especially in connection with the recognition of Germany's right to equality of armaments.[22]

The undercurrent of concern common to all groups became increasingly more distinct by the events of the ensuing

months. The issue of The Communist Party newspaper, Rote Fahne, of January 31 was suppressed for calling for a general strike against the new government. On February 1, the Reichstag was dissolved and March elections were announced. On February 2, all meetings and demonstrations of the German Communist Party were forbidden, and secret Communist arms caches were seized throughout Germany. As early as February 6, the British Ambassador was sending reports of the unscrupulous propaganda methods being used and the exclusive use of the National broadcasting system for Nazi propagandizing.[23] There was, however, no condemnation of these methods since Hitler still, at the very least, was paying lip service to the Constitution. Reporting on Hitler's campaign methods a Times editorial of February 17 stated that:

> It is to make no pronouncement on policy in the ordinary sense of the term, but to proclaim a political creed, to impose it with all the resources of official power upon the whole nationa, and to denounce, malign and thwart its opponents, open or supposed. . . . The electoral campaign of political opponents is being hampered by arbitrary devices, such as the suppression of their newspapers, the prohibition of meetings and even of the use of placards.[24]

Having reported that, however, the Times goes on to actually mitigate such actions by echoing the line it used on Hitler's accession to power by stating that "Herr Hitler has in fact . . . made a great name for himself in opposition. He has now to show that he is capable of constructive leadership in office. . . . it is well understood [abroad] that the conversion from demagogy to responsibility cannot happen overnight."[25] The Economist took a more critical view,

however, writing "Not content with suppressing the freedom of the Press, the Nazis are now carrying on their war against liberalism on all fronts. . . . But the most significant events have been the apparently uncontrolled attacks. . . upon private individuals--Gentiles of Liberal opinions and Jews of every persuasion. . . ."[26] Reports of the political tension in Germany continued to reach the Foreign Office and the Ambassador did report that under the prevailing circumstances the foundations of popular liberty and representative government could be undermined.[27] The situation was somewhat diffused, however, when Hitler advised his followers not to attend meetings of the Centre party because of the disturbances that had been caused previously--which move The Times lauded.[28] This relief was, however, temporary. Four days later, on February 27, the Reichstag building in Berlin was burnt down, a Dutch Communist was arrested in the burning building and the German Communists were blamed. There was much speculation as to who was responsible for the fire, and the British Ambassador sharply suspected that the fire had been staged by the Nazis. Hitler, however, continued to exploit the position of uncertainty and a decree suspending six articles of the Constitution concerning personal freedom, secrecy of posts and telegraphs, free speech, and the inviolability of domicile and property was issued. Later, all Communist Deputies and party officials were arrested. Some elements of the popular British press criticized the German Government, but The Times seemed to accept, for the time being at

least, the official German version, pointing out, however, that "in the present state of Europe the continuance of this high tension in Berlin must remain a danger to international peace."[29] Furthermore, it was Göring and not Hitler, who received the bulk of foreign criticism.[30]

The renewed and more virulent repression in Germany did give rise to some concern in Britain about British subjects and property in Germany, and the concern resulted in a question being asked in the House of Commons on March 1. The Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, expressed every confidence that the German Government was, and would continue to carry out its responsibility toward the lives and interests of British subjects.[31] In a message to the British Ambassador on the following day, Simon mentioned the concern in England regarding German Jews. Whilst he authorized Rumbold to make representations to the German Government concerning British interests, he maintained the traditional British stand of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations stating: "I fully realise that we have no locus standi to make representations as regards German subjects. . . ."[32] Despite this position, the Anglo-Jewish Association still made representations directly to the Government and indirectly through letters to the press regarding the plight of German Jews. At this time, however, there was not a tremendous amount of interest shown in the Jewish problem. The main concern was about the elections and their results. Although the press in England did not reflect it, there was an uneasy feeling

amongst the British press correspondents in Berlin, due to the attitude of the German Government, which was extremely sensitive to the reports of the foreign press corps in Germany.

Despite the tension that was felt in Germany, the elections of March 5 took place without too much disturbance. The result of the election was an overall majority for a coalition of the Right led by Hitler and the National Socialists, and supported by Hugenberg and the Nationalists. The fact that a majority government had at last been elected in Germany was greeted with a certain amount of relief in Britain. It seemed that, for the next four years at least, there would be a stable government in Berlin, and the prospects for an agreement on the question of disarmament seemed good. Hitler in government was still very much an unknown quantity and the official opinion, therefore, reflected this. The attitude was very much one of "wait and see," as it had been when Hitler became Chancellor in January.[33] The Times also reiterated its previous statements (see supra), adding the final, warning corollary: ". . . other nations will watch to see whether he [Hitler] can maintain the position of Germany as a 'good neighbour' in Europe that Herr Stressemann and Dr. Brüning have built up with so much real patriotism in recent years."[34]

Over the next two and a half weeks, the Nazis laid hold to the entire administration. The dispatches from the Embassy in Berlin in chronicling this "revolution" emphasized

that no policy had emerged, there are, however, indications in these texts of the general direction the German Government seemed to be taking. The two most disturbing trends were the continuation of the repressive measures seen prior to the elections, and the emergence of Hitler's attitude to disarmament and collective security. On March 11, Hitler made a speech in which he expressed little faith in international solidarity and stated that he was for force as the "eternal mother of rights." Just at this time the British and French were seeking some kind of disarmament formula in Geneva. The excesses and unnecessary violence of the Nazis continued to be reported, and on March 21 the Ambassador wrote in his dispatch: "The gaols and places of detention are crowded at the moment with political prisoners . . . .(and) His Majesty's consuls report the summary arrests all over the country of officials and politicians belonging to the left."[35] The climax of these events was the passing of the Enabling Bill on March 23 which marked the beginning of Hitler's dictatorial powers.

The immediate official reaction to these events is unclear. The dispatches from Berlin are almost exclusively informational, and there is certainly no Cabinet discussion about the problem. The problem of disarmament and Jewish persecution were reported in the press. On March 11, The Times reported: "Sullen and discontented before, Germany under Herr Hitler has become clamorous and self-assertive; and the claims which she puts forward have intensified the

fears of neighboring countries that she means to try to obtain satisfaction by force."[36] The report continues with a pessimistic view of the possibilities for the Disarmament Conference, but shifts some of the blame to France for the tardy proposals before the Conference in Geneva. Had they been made six months earlier, it is argued, the situation in Germany might have been very different.

The mood of the press in particular, and the country in general, was becoming increasingly anti-German during this period largely due to the systematic persecutions being carried out. It should be pointed out here, however, that this anti-German feeling is almost exclusively anti-Nazi or Hitler. This subtle, and sometimes ambiguous sentiment becomes increasingly important. Later in the period under review, the British Government tried on the one hand to assuage German demands whilst coming to realize that Germany under Hitler could be a very real threat to peace. Out of this prevailing mood, however, came two pleas of mitigation. On March 12, Lloyd-George made a speech in the House of Commons, stating that:

> Germany did its best to carry that treaty (Versailles) through. . . . It was our part to see that we, and the other nations which signed the treaty, followed suit. But armaments have gone up year by year while those of Germany have been kept down. . . . The result is that they (the other European Nations) have driven Germany to an aggressive military dictatorship, which is a menace to the peace of the world and which is fatal to disarmament.[37]

Two weeks later the British Ambassador in Berlin sent a report to the Foreign Office stating:

> 6. Before the Hitlerite Government took office in February, the Jewish problem in Germany was admittedly becoming a serious one. Ever since the revolution (1920) Jews have been given fair play in every walk of life in this country, with the result that their racial superiority was asserting itself. . . . to an almost alarming extent. . . . In a country where they hardly amount to 2 per cent of the population, they have practically monopolised some professions and have obtained the plums of a great many others. . . . It is only natural that the academic youth of this country should bitterly resent the success of the Jews. . . .[38]

It should be noted here, however, that this is mitigation for the German people and not of the Nazis or Hitler.

The persecution of the Jews continued with the announcement of a boycott of Jewish shops, goods, lawyers and doctors from 10 a.m. on April 1. It was further suggested that the number of Jews allowed to enter the learned professions should be limited. The measure was stated to be directed against Jewish agitation abroad. On March 30, Sir John Simon, in the House of Commons, and Lord Hailsham, in the House of Lords, answered questions about the boycott and stated the traditional British position--that there was no question of British interference in the affairs of another country on behalf of the subjects of that other country. There were many letters in the newspapers condemning the proposed actions in Germany, and one or two giving tacit support to the Nazis. In the April 1 edition of The Economist, it was stated that one of the surest indices of a civilized country was the treatment of the Jews in it. It was claimed, furthermore, whilst Britain, France, Holland, and America provided good examples for the treatment of Jews, Germany did not.

For twelve hours, from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. on Saturday, April 1, throughout Germany, there was a complete boycott of all Jewish stores and services, including doctors and lawyers, strictly enforced by brown-shirts who barred entry to Jewish establishments. That evening, in London, there was a meeting at Whitechapel backed by an interdenominational group of Anglicans, Roman Catholics and Jews. The meeting received telegrams of support from leading members of the Labour Party--Lord Snowdon, George Lansbury, and Atlee--and was used to denounce Germany's treatment of the Jews. Although the continuation of the boycott, which was scheduled for the following Wednesday, was much less intensely enforced, the problem of German handling of the Jews simmered for several months. The Times, the Manchester Guardian, The Observer, and The Economist maintained a strong line of criticism against Germany, particularly over the Jewish issue, and, although they maintained an impartial stance, the Government remained informed on the situation and did come under pressure from backbench M.P.'s to take a firm stance against Germany. On April 13, for example, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in an adjournment debate on foreign policy, warned against the new spirit of German nationalism, describing it as:

> The worst of the All-Prussian Imperialism, with an added savagery, a racial pride, an exclusiveness which cannot allow to any fellow-subject not of "pure Nordic birth" equality of rights and citizenship within the nation to which he belongs. . . . Europe is menaced and Germany is afflicted by this narrow, exclusive, aggressive spirit, where it is a

> crime to be in favour of peace and a crime to be a Jew. That is not the Germany to which we can afford to make concessions. That is not the Germany to which Europe can afford to give the equality [of armaments] of which the Prime Minister spoke.[39]

In the same debate, Winston Churchill was already prophesying war, and two weeks later Lord Grey of Falloden, Foreign Secretary prior to the First World War, addressed the Liberal Council and stated that "The great security for peace at the present moment is that Germany is not in a position to go to war."[40]

There is a certain paradox in the British attitude to Germany in as much as whilst the outcry against what was essentially a German internal problem was going on both inside and outside Parliament, the Government was in the middle of trade negotiations with Germany. For some weeks, representatives of the German Government had been conferring in London over the possibility of a deal involving the British coal industry and it was announced in Parliament on April 12 that a limited trade agreement had been reached between the two countries. For some time, Britain had been concerned about the fall of coal imports to the Weser and the Elbe, and by this agreement they were to double in exchange for a reduction in the import duty on certain articles in which Germany was interested. When the agreement came before the House of Commons for discussions, the mood of the House was not anti-German but questioning of the usefulness of the agreement not because it was with Germany but because it was not comprehensive enough. On May 1,

Sir Austen Chamberlain, who three weeks before had been denouncing Germany's virulent nationalism, asked the government to take more time to broaden the scope of the agreement, which at the time only benefitted the coal industry.[41] Although the other speeches in the debate generally endorsed this view, the Government's motion was carried and the agreement came into effect on May 8.

To complicate matters further, on March 18 the Italian Government proposed a political agreement between France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy, which became known as the Four Power Pact. There can be little doubt that Mussolini, the head of the Italian Government, was primarily acting on behalf of and in the interests of Germany, since the most controversial clauses of the agreement concerned equality of rights in armament. It stated that:

> . . . should the Disarmament Conference only produce partial results, the equality of rights which has been granted to Germany must have practical application, and Germany undertakes to achieve such equality of rights gradually as a result of successive agreements arrived at by the Four Powers through the normal diplomatic channels.[42]

Secondly, it embodied "the principle of the revision of treaties of peace in circumstances capable of producing conflict between nations."[43] The British government was impressed by the Italian proposals, which were framed entirely within the context of the League of Nations and seemed to provide a safety-net should the Disarmament Conference in Geneva fail.[44] Negotiations continued through the rest of March and the beginning of April, and despite a stormy debate in the House of Commons on April 13, went on through July. Although the Government

was enthusiastic about the Pact, reaction in the press and Parliament were not so favourable. In the debate on April 13, Clement Atlee, the Leader of the Labour Party, demanded that "This country should tell Germany that if she wanted revision of the Peace Treaties she must come with clean hands."[45] In the same debate, Sir Austen Chamberlain, in his speech (quoted supra), stated that: "What is passing in Germany seems to me to render this a singularly inopportune moment to talk about the revision of treaties. . . ."[46] The press seemed similarly unenthusiastic. In The Times, on Saturday, April 29, the editorial was very firm about treaty revision--it stated:

> In point of fact, the view that the Treaty of Versailles was an unjust and vindictive instrument was held, outside Germany, only by comparatively small groups of intellectuals and pacifists of precisely that mentality which, inside Germany, the Nazi movement has violently suppressed. Moderate opinion in this country, at any rate, considers that the Peace Treaties were on the whole justly and considerately framed, and that their territorial provisions correspond closely to racial distribution in Europe. It is, however, realized that certain clauses, and in a minor degree some of the territorial arrangements, have pressed hardly upon the vanquished countries. . . . Some modifications have already been made. It may be judged wise and equitable to make others.

The Times, however, asked for an "unambiguous statement that no drastic refashioning of the map of Europe is even remotely intended."[47] This cautious line is quite clear: the treaties, although containing one or two problems, were essentially fair and any major revision--of the kind that Germany might ask for--should not be made. Despite this opposition, the Government

remained largely in favour of the proposed Pact, stating that it represented "that spirit of mutual cooperation without which European recovery would be impossible and the prospect of world peace would be jeopardized,"[48] and worked as a kind of intermediary between the apparently conflicting interests of France and Germany. Although the Pact was signed in mid-July it never received the necessary ratification and, therefore, lapsed.

The early summer months were further confused by two other problems--Austro-German relations and the German demand for air power. The demand for air power occurred after an unconfirmed leaflet-drop on Berlin, and was followed by questions in the House of Commons on reports that Germany had started to re-equip its Air Force, a direct infraction of the Versailles Treaty. At the time, however, what was to become known as the "German Air Menace" did not arouse much comment. Before moving on to Austro-German relations, which did cause some comment in Britain, it is worth noting that on June 2 an article on the whole praising the new spirit of industry and national pride in Germany appeared in the London Times,[49] and that throughout June the correspondence columns of the Times seemed to encourage German ambitions in the Polish corridor. Early in June, the tension, which had been growing between Austria and Germany since the beginning of the year, increased to the point that the Austrian Government sought the intervention of other powers, which would have been justifiable under the Four Power Pact.[50] On Wednesday, June 7, The Times

reported: "The policy of Herr Hitler towards Austria is one of arrogant interference with the internal Austrian affairs by bringing indirect pressure to bear upon the head of her present government."[51] Parliament was not sitting at the time, so this editorial in The Times was the nearest thing to official statement that appeared. In late July and early August, however, representations were made through the British Ambassador in Berlin to the German Government concerning both air re-armament and Austro-German relations. The Germans indicated that they felt the representations concerning Austria were uncalled for interference, and because there was no desire to escalate the problem, nothing more could be done; the question of air re-armament was moved to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

In Britain, August is a time of pause, and it was this lull in political activity which prompted the German Ambassador to London, Baron von Hoesch, to draw up a balance sheet of Anglo-German relations which is a good analysis of the state of British opinion. He notes that whilst on the one hand, there was a general loss of sympathy in socialist, labour union, pacifist, and liberal circles, on the other hand, a certain sympathy had been developed on the right wing of British politics. On the whole, however, von Hoesch felt that in the political arena, Germany had lost a lot of support, although public sentiment seemed to favour Germany. He stated that the King had become increasingly hostile to Germany, but that other members of the Royal Family and in particular the

successor to the throne, Edward, Prince of Wales, were very sympathetic, as were other members of the upper-class. On the other hand, in ecclesiastical and financial circles, there was a general anti-German sentiment.[52] The general tenor of the dispatch was that Britain was anti-Germany which hampered a general economic agreement which the government had wanted to push for.[53]

Despite the generally unfavourable climate of opinion in Britain at the time, the Government was still working with Germany on the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The British position, however, was an ambiguous and difficult one. Whilst, on the one hand, it was prepared to accept the principle of German equality of armaments, on the other hand it had to be receptive to French demands and European security in general. Therefore, although prepared to make concessions and whilst exerting pressure on the French to do the same, Britain did expect Germany to meet the other powers half-way. The German breaches of the Versailles Treaty, and especially the clauses governing air power, were of increasing concern to the participants of the members of the Disarmament Conference, and the mood in September was tense. The conference had adjourned in late June because of deadlock over French demands for a guarantee of security, and when it reconvened a French proposal for a probationary period of international supervision was rejected by the Germans. The crisis was precipitated by the announcement by Sir John Simon of British support for the French plan. With this announcement, the German delegates

were recalled to Berlin for discussions, and it was from Berlin that Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations was announced. Furthermore, a referendum and general election concerning the Disarmament Conference was to be held in Germany. The attitude of the British Government to this news was not entirely pessimistic. Sir John Simon wrote to the King:

> It would be reckless to declare that Germany's withdrawal (from the Conference and the League) has destroyed all prospects of a Disarmament Convention. It would be foolish to pretend that her withdrawal makes no difference. . . . [I feel] that Herr Hitler's theatrical action in withdrawing from Geneva is an attempt to introduce into the international field the methods by which he has attained power inside Germany, and that time must be given to see how this works out. Fortunately, time is available, for Germany is at present quite incapable of undertaking aggression. Europe forewarned is, in a sense Europe forearmed."[54]

This cautious optimism was, no doubt, due to a communication from the new Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Edward Phipps, in which he reported an interview with the German Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, indicating that Germany was still willing to continue disarmament conversations.[55] The Government attitude was reflected in The Times.[56]

Despite the fact that the elections that were held in Germany in November were regarded as so much window dressing, and there results a foregone conclusion,[57] it was felt that some good may be salvaged from the situation. On Monday, November 13, Lord Lothian, in a letter to The Times which was endorsed in the editorial that day, asked for an understanding of the German point of view, in the hope that some

kind of peace and stability in Europe could be established. The next day in The Times editorial, after being highly critical of the referenda and the internal situation in Germany, commented that:

> There is no reason to believe that all the talk during the election campaign about 'peaceful negotiation' with foreign countries was insincere. But it is also clear that there is a grim determination in the Nazi mind that, if German aspirations cannot obtain a diplomatic hearing, then military methods will have to be employed . . . . There can be no tranquility or equilibrium in Europe so long as a galling sense of inferiority agitates one of its most important states.[58]

Although there is some ambiguity here, there is definite hope as well as an attempt to understand the German point of view. This hope was reinforced by two events which followed the referenda in November. On November 16, it was reported that negotiations between Germany and Poland began on the subject of a non-aggression pact, and in December the Germans offered terms on disarmament.

There is a certain equivocation in the British reaction to Germany throughout 1933. On the one hand, there was a suspicion of Germany, largely as a result of the internal "revolution" and the excesses which seemed to follow. On the other hand, there was the hope that "when the first exuberance of the German National Revolution has passed, and its peculiar form of propagandist genius is no longer given undisputed sway, much that is now alarming will prove to have been froth."[59] There was a considerable amount of criticism of Germany, but also an attempt to keep Germany in the comity of nations.

III

1933 ended with much hope that some agreement on disarmament could be reached, and to this end there was a flurry of dispatches between London and the European Embassies concerning the proposals made by Hitler himself. The British Government had hoped at least to keep communications open by using the German proposals of October, 1933 as a framework, and were eager to let Hitler know that, although a final agreement had to be subject to debate among all the powers, there was, in fact, a basis for discussion.[1] These hopes of an early settlement of the disarmament question with which 1933 ended, however, were dashed early in January, 1934, when the French rejected the German proposals for a disarmament schedule. Despite this set-back, talks continued and a "Memorandum on Disarmament"[2] was drawn up by the British Foreign Office. Although its general tenor was firm, it reiterated the concept of equality of rights and clearly stated that "the situation must be reached in which arms of a kind permitted to one State cannot continue to be denied another."[3]

The agreement that was reached between Germany and Poland late in January was a reassuring event. The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact which was signed on January 26 and was to last for ten years was greated with delight both inside and outside Government circles.[4] On January 30, The Times editorialized:

> . . . considering the violence of the propaganda carried out by the National Socialists condemning the existence of the [Polish] corridor, the Ten-Year Pact is a signal proof of the moderation which Herr Hitler knows how to use when he likes, and the readiness of his countrymen to follow his lead.[5]

The editorial appeared on the first anniversary of the Hitler regime and went on to say:

> As the naturally strong prejudices against the brutality of his earlier methods subsides, and judgement of Germany again becomes unbiased, it is generally recognized that Herr Hitler's fundamental aim is to restore Germans' belief in themselves and to make Germany respected--perhaps feared--abroad.[6]

Hitler chose the first anniversary of his regime to address the Reichstag, giving a summary of events which led up to the formation of his Government and its achievements over the previous year. When dealing with foreign policy, Hitler maintained that equality of rights was the only way to obtain peace, but was at pains to point out his peaceful intentions in the resolution of all political and economic differences. The Times, commenting favourably on the speech, stated: "It is clear that Herr Hitler can pursue a policy of internal reform and external conciliation with greater freedom and with greater power than was possible to any of his predecessors in office."[7] On the same day, however, Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to Berlin, sent a lengthy review of German foreign policy aims which was of a very different tenor. In commenting on the Hitler Government, he stated that they were men:

> . . . whose ultimate aims are much the same [as those of Weimar], but whose radically different methods may at some future date precipitate international

> conflict. For Nazi Germany believes neither in the League [of Nations] nor in negotiation, and claims with some justice that the experience of the last fourteen years has converted the vast mass of the German nation, and particularly the younger generation, to their point of view.[8]

The telegram goes on to state that although the general aims of German foreign policy, that is fusion with Austria, rectification of frontiers, and the recovery of some colonial territories, had not changed, the methods by which they could be achieved had. One problem that seemed pivotal to Phipps was the reacquisition of the Saar, which was still in French hands. Until such time as the Saar question was resolved to the advantage of Germany, Hitler, it seemed to Phipps, was likely to show some moderation--after that he could be more adventurous. The communication ends with this warning:

> 13. Whilst it may be said that a Nationalist Germany will not be deterred in the long run from pursuing her policy by mere consideration that it may lead to war, for the moment she desires peace, for the reason that she is not prepared for war. . . . But she demands equality of armaments as a right. Later, she will presumably demand territorial revision of the 'unjust' peace treaties also as a right, and will hope to secure these desiderata by peaceful means. . . . If these methods fail and the 'just' claims of Germany should lead to war, the blame will be laid on her enemies. . . .

This dispatch, which was also seen by the Prime Minister, was called by Sir John Simon, "a most illuminating document--and terrifying.[10] Since this document would not have been seen outside Government circles, there was no further comment on it.

The concern expressed by Phipps was already being voiced by oghers. On February 7, Winston Churchill made a

speech in the House of Commons on the perils of neglecting defence, particularly air defence. Stating that, "We are vulnerable as we have never been before", Churchill painted a very vivid picture of the destruction that could be wrought by bombs falling on London.[11] Furthermore, he is quite explicit in viewing Germany as the thread to world peace.

In late February and early March, Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seal, embarked upon a tour of the capitals of France, Germany, and Italy in order to try to further disarmament negotiations. There was no real progress made toward a disarmament agreement, but it did become clear that Germany was rearming toward her goal of equality of armaments. In commenting upon this, The Times maintained that although this was, in fact, contrary to the Versailles Treaty, "How indeed can a country properly be denied the means to defend itself."[12] This attitude, which was to become more widely shared (see infra) was entirely consistent with the hope that Germany could be returned, as a responsible member, to the community of Nations (see supra), but ignored the misgivings already being voiced in some quarters.

On March 8, Churchill made another speech in the House of Commons on air power. In it he stated his opinion:

> Germany is ruled by a handful of autocrats. . . . They are men who have neither the long interests of a dynasty to consider, nor those very important restraints which a democratic Parliament and constitutional system impose upon any executive Government. . . .
>
> I dread the day when the means [air power] of threatening the heart of the British Empire should pass into the hands of the present rulers of Germany. . . .

> . . .Germany is arming. . . . and no one will stop her. . . . The spirit of aggressive nationalism was never more rife in Europe and in the world.[13]

The sentiments of this speech were reiterated a week later, on March 14, but did not gain any widespread support. In fact, in an editorial on March 23, The Times criticised the French Government for blocking an agreement on disarmament.[14]

Whilst Churchill was prophesying German belligerence, the Cabinet met to discuss the potential threat that Germany posed. Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India, felt that Germany was not as great a threat to security as was recently suggested but feared a recurrence of the situation immediately prior to the First World War when everyone was preparing for war with Germany and that inevitably had led to war. Sir John Simon felt that Germany was not threatening or aggressive toward Britain but could become so, although he felt that the threat to peace was more likely in Eastern Europe. Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, felt that some means other than massive defence spending should be sought to offset any potential threat. The general conclusion of the meeting was that, if the disarmament discussions were to fail, Germany could become a potential threat to others. In those circumstances, the Cabinet should consider two possible alternatives: first, to reach some kind of security agreements to provide against a breach of the peace; secondly, to face heavy defence expenditure although it may turn out that these would not be exclusive alternatives or the only alternatives.[15] This drawing of positions seems prescient of future events.

On March 28, the German Government announced a sizable increase in expenditure of the Army, Navy, and Air Ministries. On the following Saturday, March 31, The Times discussed this increase, not in terms of the possible threat to national security, but in reference to the claim that Germany was unable to pay foreign debts. It was the economic problems, not security, that were of more concern at this time. The reaction of the Government was somewhat different, however, and concern was also expressed in questions in the House of Commons. It would seem that the answer made by the German Government set the British minds at rest, at least temporarily.[16] Early in April, however, Sir Robert Vansittart wrote a paper in support of the Defence Requirements Committee which envisaged Germany as "the ultimate potential enemy."[17] He adds:

> There is probably no immediate danger. As the Defence Requirements Committee puts it: 'We have time, though not too much time, to make defensive preparations'. . . . The Germans are too competent, and matters are now moving too fast, to make a long estimate a safe one. . . . One thing admits no query: the proclaimed ends of the present Nazi Government can only be realised as the result of great sacrifices of, or on the part of, other Powers, including ourselves.[18]

Later in April, the King had an interview with the German Ambassador, von Hoesch, which was recorded by his Private Secretary, Sir Clive Wigram. He said that:

> . . . at the present moment, Germany was the peril of the world, and that, if she went on at the present rate, there was bound to be a war within ten years. The King asked what Germany was arming for? No one wanted to attack her, but she was forcing all the other countries to be prepared for an attack on her part. The Ambassador tried to excuse Germany by saying that the French fortifications were impregnable and that Germany had no fortifications on her side.

> His Majesty ridiculed this idea, and said that in the last war fortifications were useless and would be even more so in the next.[19]

The next event that elicited a response from Britain was the suppression of a potential coup and a purging of certain enemies or suspected enemies of the Nazi regime on June 30. The statement by Göring for the German Government maintained that a clique of S.A. leaders who wished to start a second revolution were detected and suppressed rather brutally. At least seventy-seven people lost their lives, including an ex-Chancellor of the Reich. The British Government refrained from comment since this was largely an internal problem. The Times, however, decried the medieval methods:

> What is ominously symptomatic of the present state of Germany is the savagery, the disregard for all forms of law which are the indispensible safeguards of justice and which are sacrosanct in every modern civilised state.[20]

It should be remembered that the purging of the Nazi regime was largely an internal matter and, therefore, was largely open to private comment only. The concept of the brutal nature of the Nazi Government, which earlier in 1934 had been fading (see supra), re-emerged, but there was no international threat posed by the event.

The German attitude toward Austria, a problem that had been simmering for a time, came to the fore again in July, and was the next question which concerned the British Government, as well as those of France and Italy. The propaganda campaign, which the Nazis had been carrying out in Austria to try to

force or at least precipitate some kind of Austro-German unification, had caused much concern in Britain and caused Sir John Simon to state in the House of Commons that "the independence and safety of Austria are an essential to which British policy is directed."[21] In February, 1934, the British, French, and Italian Governments jointly announced the common view of the necessity of maintaining Austrian independence. It is, however, quite clear that by March, the German Government was taking a different approach to the Austrian question, preferring to build up the strength of the Nazi Party within Austria rather than trying to precipitate a solution by force or propaganda.[22] When, as part of a Putsch by the Austrian Nazi Party, the Austrian leader Dr. Dollfuss, was murdered, Hitler did not attempt to intervene. The murder was condemned in Britain and in September, the British, French and Italian Governments reaffirmed their declaration of the previous February, but The Times maintained:

> It would be unfair, in the light of present information, to attribute to the German Government the responsibility for yesterday's reckless adventure; but unquestionably the revolt owes something to the persistent instigation that has come from Germany.[23]

This seems to be a representative view.

In the last five months of 1934, there was no real incident. Winston Churchill made several speeches on air power and the German air menace, but his was largely a lone voice. On November 28, however, Stanley Baldwin, as Lord President of the Council, addressed the House of Commons for the Government in a debate on National defence. In his address, Baldwin maintained:

> . . . the malaise today in Europe is not only fear, but ignorance outside of Germany and secrecy inside. . . .
>
> Situated where Germany is, she is more dependent than most of us on friendship and on trading with her neighbours. . . . May the opportunity come before long when she will tear this veil of secrecy away and bring to light the things that are alarming Europe, and we may discuss them and see what, even now, may be done.[24]

There are mixed feelings voiced here. On the one hand, there is an apprehension of what may be happening in Germany; on the other, a willingness to discuss any problems, particularly trade, which may be confronting Germany. There also seems to be an attempt to allay alarmist fears. The next day, The Times editorialized:

> No doubt from the German point of view, the necessary preliminary to this re-entry into the community of nations is the recognition of German equality in some practical manner. It is deplorable that Germany should be setting herself to gain it by a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. But it would not be fair to put the whole responsibility for that upon her shoulders.[25]

These views were similar to those expressed throughout the previous day's debate.

The year 1934, rather than being one of great action in Anglo-German relations, was one of solidification of views. Two groups can be seen to be forming. On the one hand, there was an attempt to accommodate Germany within the international community; on the other, there was an attempt to forewarn the Government of the danger of a violently nationalistic Germany.

IV

It is difficult to avoid treating international relations separately from events in other fields. When dealing with a specialized topic, such as Anglo-German relations, it is even harder to conceive of any other events impinging upon that subject. The consideration of the Government of India Bill took up much of Parliament's time early in 1935, as did many other domestic matters, and Anglo-German relations must take their place within that framework.

In January, 1935, the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, wrote to the King expressing some optimism for an improvement in European relations and outlining the Government's position. He wrote:

> The point which Sir John as been pressing is that the practical choice is between a Germany which continues to re-arm without any regulation or agreement, and a Germany which, through getting a recognition of its rights and some modifications of the Peace Treaties, enters into the comity of nations, and contributes, in this and other ways, to European stability. As between these two courses, there can be no doubt which is the wiser.[1]

Two days later, the King's Private Secretary, Lord Wigram, wrote to the British Ambassador in Berlin in a less optimistic frame of mind. In his letter, he wrote that: "His Majesty feels that we must not be blinded by the apparent sweet reasonableness of the Germans, but be wary and not be taken unawares."[2] The King's position precluded making public statements on foreign policy and, therefore, the Government's view held sway.

The first problem to arise in 1935 was the status of the Saar region. Under the Treaty of Versailles, the mines of the Saar were ceded to France, and an International Commission was set up to administer the territory. In addition, provision was made for a plebiscite in order that inhabitants of the region could choose to maintain the existing system, unite with France, or unite with Germany. The plebiscite was scheduled to take place on January 13, 1935. The voting went off peacefully and the results were announced on January 15 with an overwhelming 90% in favour of re-unification with Germany. The following day, The Times editorialized:

> In any case the Saar vote has been fairly and freely taken: and the reunited province will be as preponderantly Nazi as the rest of Germany. . . . For them, as for the majority in the Reich, Herr Hitler is Germany; and it is a sentiment which the world outside will be wise to accept. The result of the Saar vote should further strengthen the position of the Leader; it may also make it easier for him to pursue his policy of moderation.[3]

The territory was ceded to Germany on March 1.

On March 4, the Government issued a White Paper on defence which outlined plans for an increase in all areas of defence spending, Germany being named as one of the causes for this increase. Because of the White Paper, a proposed visit by Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin was postponed by Hitler until March 25 because he had 'caught a cold'. The White Paper was debated in Parliament on the following Monday, March 11, and The Times carried a long editorial concerning it. Maintaining that the increased spending was to bring the British armed forces up to date and establish an equality of armaments in Europe, The Times went on to say:

> The essential and immediate requirement for the stabilisation of Europe is in fact the equal participation of Germany. . . . If it is the intention of the British Government to get Part V of the Versailles Treaty superseded by a system in which all are equal, then no purpose is served by harping on a breach of the Treaty--a breach, moreover, for which it is unfair to blame Germany alone. The principle of equality has been accepted. That equality is being gradually attained. Its final attainment will probably afford the last chance of establishing a general system for the limitation of armaments. . . . The decision has been taken to treat Germany as an equal. That policy must be carried out single mindedly.[4]

It is also interesting to note that the announcement in Berlin of the actual existence of a German Air Force, a fact that had never been officially admitted, caused no comment in The Times.

On March 15, the French Chamber of Deputies voted to extend compulsory military service by two years and using this as a pretext, on Saturday, March 16, Hitler announced the reintroduction of conscription in Germany and renounced Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, which dealt with the question of armaments. This caused a flurry of activity in London and ministers returned to London for hurriedly called meetings. On March 18, The Times denounced this flagrant breach of the Treaty of Versailles which seems to contradict what it had printed the previous week (see supra), but went on to say, in a more conciliatory tone:

> If Herr Hitler's move is simply a rather crude method of assertingGerman equality, then no irreparable harm has been done. The negotiations can go forward. The visit should be paid to Berlin according to plan. . . . But it becomes of more urgent importance than ever to know from Herr Hitler himself whether Germany intends, sincerely and wholeheartedly, to play her part in that system, and to join with others in an equitable plan for the general limitation of armaments.[5]

Other influential papers like the News Chronicle, the Daily Mirror, and the Daily Express were more understanding, and the Labour Party paper, the Daily Herald, went so far as to say that Hitler's declaration constituted an invitation to general disarmament.[6] The Government was not so optimistic, and Sir John Simon wrote to the King:

> There may be a certain advantage in the German Government having come out into the open. But it is Sir John's view that the German Government do not really want to make an agreement or at least only wish to do so on German terms which would be intolerable for others. It must not be assumed that the present demands for conscription and a large army is the end of the list: on the contrary, the demilitarized zone, the navy, Memel, Danzig, and the former German colonies, may be expected to be in the ultimate German programme.
>
> But Sir John feels that there is no advantage in refusing to go to Berlin, small though the prospects are of any positive results.[7]

The visit of Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin went ahead as planned despite the previous diplomatic insult of Hitler's cold and the announcement on March 16. The reason for the meetings was to discuss the possibility of an Eastern Locarno, proposals for which had been mooted in 1934, and the question of Germany's return to the League of Nations. Nothing definite was really accomplished by the talks and a disheartened Simon wrote in his diary:

> The practical result of our Berlin visit is to establish that Germany greatly desires a good understanding with Britain, but that she is determined to go her own way in rearmament; that she expects in time to get all Germany within her borders, including Austria, that she does not fear isolation and has no intention of joining in collective security: and that she wants the ex-German colonies back before returning to the League of Nations. All this is pretty hopeless; for if Germany will not

> co-operate for confirming the solidarity of Europe, the rest of Europe ought to co-operate to preserve it in spite of Germany. This may not prevent an ultimate explosion, but it will delay it.[8]

A more optimistic view was put forward in The Times on April 4, and since both at home and abroad it was seen largely as a Government organ (see supra) it is worth quoting at some length.

> Germany. . . . has perhaps been somewhat hastily condemned in authoritative quarters as an enemy of the whole collective system because she also objects to the proposed Eastern Security Pact. It is known that Herr Hitler is ready to have pacts of non-aggression with every neighbour of Germany--except Lithuania, because of special difficulties in Memel; and he is also ready. . . to agree that all the separate pacts should be united in a general Convention. . . . It may not be a whole collective system. But it certainly does not conflict with it; and it should form a possible basis on which this country can still at this moment pursue its object of organizing peace. . . .
>
> There is need for education at this moment, for it is clear that far too much stress has been laid on the negative side of Herr Hitler's statements to Sir John Simon, and that far too little attempt has been made to fix attention on their positive side. It is a matter of common knowledge now that Herr Hitler arrived some time ago at a figure which in his view German armed strength ought to reach in relation to the present strength of his neighbours; but the Berlin conversations seemed to have made it clear that he is also willing, having disclosed his figure, to discuss with them a proportionate all round reduction.[9]

This editorial is even more surprising in the light of the editorial on March 18 (see supra), however, it did set a tone for wider reactions.

Shortly after The Times editorial appeared, representatives of Britain, France and Italy meet at Stressa, from April 11 to 14, to discuss Germany's rearmament and the further possibility of an Eastern Security Pact. Again, there was no positive result from the Conference--approval of an Eastern

Pact was reaffirmed and Germany was criticized for the breaches of Versailles, but no definite action was taken. Approaches were made from Stressa to Germany to try to get some further progress of the Eastern Pact but everything was at the level of conversations. On April 15, The Times published a very pro-German editorial which completed the about-face from March 18. In it, the editor stated:

> . . .Germany herself was promised equality in 1932, and if the concealment so long officially maintained by the German Government in regard to rearmament was reprehensible, what other method is in practice possible to an advanced country to whom parity has been promised?[10]

The Times, thus, completely vindicates Hitler's actions and German's position.

Whilst the meeting was taking place at Stressa, the Prince of Wales had a long conversation with the German Ambassador in London in which he clearly showed his sympathy for the regime in Berlin. When asked if he had misgivings about the reintroduction of conscription in Germany, the Prince replied that he "took it as a matter of course that Germany had not wished permanently to remain in a state of unilateral disarmament and he had long foreseen that, if there was no general disarmament, Germany would one day take it upon herself to decide the scale of her armaments."[11] At the end of the conversation, the Prince assured the Ambassador, "once more of his deep sympathy for the wishes of the great German people and by expressing the hope that solutions might be found which would be acceptable to Germany and which would,

therefore, contribute to safeguarding world peace."[12] The Prince made his feelings public a month later when he addressed the British Legion in London, saying:

> I feel that there is no more suitable body or organisation of men to stretch forth the hand of friendship to the Germans than we ex-Servicemen who fought them in the Great War and have now forgotten all about that.[13]

This prominent, and public stance by a member of the Royal Family is unusual, but these views expressed by the heir-apparent to the throne were those held by his social set, and were common to one segment of the British upper-classes.[14]

Shortly after the Stressa Conference, the question of a naval agreement came to the fore. In January, 1935, two private visits were made to Berlin. The first was made by Clifford Allen, a friend and confidante of the Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald; and the second was by Philip Kerr, an influential Conservative. Both had meetings with Hitler, and at both meetings, the possibility of a naval agreement between Britain and Germany was discussed. Kerr mentioned the possibility of an agreement to Baldwin and to Simon, and for the next few weeks worked as an intermediary between London and Berlin. By May, the groundwork for negotiations was laid, and as an additional incentive, Berlin submitted plans for an air pact to the British Government at the end of that month. Talks started in London on June 4 and encountered difficulties immediately, although The Times gave an encouraging editorial for the opening day of the talks. It stated:

> Whatever differences of views may exist, it is altogether desirable that they be brought into the open, for the greatest enemy of understanding is secrecy. . . . and now at last there appears to be a possibility of reconciling what has sometimes seemed a conflict of irreconcilable claims for equality and security.[15]

The Germans wanted to settle on a ratio of 35 per cent of British naval tonnage from the outset, whilst the British wanted no such restrictions on negotiations. This impasse could have posed problems to a final agreement, but the next day the British agreed to the 35 per cent principle, and by June 6 the treaty was almost ready. On June 7, there was a reorganization of the British Government in which Stanley Baldwin became Prime Minister and Sir Samuel Hoare replaced Simon as Foreign Secretary (Simon was moved to the Home Office), but Hoare was no less eager to conclude an agreement, and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was finalized in the form of an exchange of notes, on June 18. On June 14, The Times began to prepare public opinion for the ensuing agreement with a long editorial. In it it was stated:

> The attempt to obtain an all-embracing arms agreement between sixty nations at Geneva having failed, the British Government have wisely determined to advance step by step. The naval agreement is one. The Air Locarno should be the next. . . .
>
> In its broadest aspects. . . there is not the slightest doubt that the agreement if it comes will be generally welcomed in this country. . . . Although in practice it involves a tacit disregard of the Treaty of Versailles, yet, inasmuch as it will substitute a new agreement for a section of the disarmament clause of the Treaty, it will constitute an important advance in the process of getting peace established upon the firm ground of agreements freely concluded. . . .
>
> Herr Hitler believes in the renaissance of the West. . . . Here is a field for a nobler more constructive activity than exclusive concentration on negative plans for preventing war.[16]

The broad agreement was that German naval tonnage was fixed at 35 per cent of the British, and submarine tonnage at 45 per cent. The reaction to the Treaty was almost universally favourable except for spokesmen like Winston Churchill and Austen Chamberlain. In a speech in the House of Commons, on July 11 when the Treaty came up for debate, Churchill asserted:

> We have condoned this unilateral violation of the Treaty [of Versailles], and we have become a party to it without agreement with any of the other countries concerned. We have, however unintentionally, nullified and stultified the League of Nations' condemnation of treaty breaking. . . in which. . . we took a leading part. . . .
>
> During the last six weeks, the League of Nations has been weakened by our action, the principle of collective security has been impaired. . . .
>
> I cannot feel that this German Naval Agreement is at all a matter for rejoicing. I remain still under this impression, that the one great fear of Europe is the power and might of the rearmed strength of Germany, and that the one great hope is the gathering together of powers. . . in order that this tremendous process of the rearmament of Germany may not be attended by some lamentable breakdown of peace.[17]

In his autobiography, Sir Samuel Hoare recorded a conversation explaining the position of the Government by saying that there was no question of "placating Hitler. Seeing, however, Hitler's growing strength. . . . we were forced to play for time. . . . The alternatives were either drift or preventive war. No one in Great Britain was prepared to go to war with Germany in order to stop German rearmament. . . . The alternative of drift had let him build up an army as strong as France and an air force as strong as ours."[18] Despite adverse criticism by people like Churchill, then, it was hoped that the very

process of a series of agreements of this kind would maintain peace in Europe.

Discussions about the possibility of an "Air Locarno" continued throughout the rest of the year but no real advance was made toward an agreement. Furthermore, the Abyssinian crisis came to the fore in the second half of 1935, when the Italians invaded Abyssinia. Thus, with the triumph of the Naval Agreement, Anglo-German relations maintained an even keel throughout the rest of the year.

V

The calm and friendly atmosphere in Anglo-German relations, with which 1935 ended, cooled somewhat in 1936. This was partly due to the fact that Germany suspended talks on an Air Locarno because of the Franco-Soviet Pact which was signed in May, 1935. There was a sudden unfavourable reaction to Germany in the British press which Germans noted.[1] It was also a period of turmoil in Britain. The ill-fated attempt to solve the Abyssinian Crisis by the Hoare-Laval plan of 1935, had caused the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare as Foreign Secretary and the appointment of Anthony Eden to replace him. In addition, the death of George V, in January, 1936, caused some uncertainty.

There was an air of anticipation and uncertainty with the accession of Edward VIII, the Germans were aware of the new King's pro-German sympathies, and late in January were informed, by their Ambassador to the United States, of a conversation between the then Prince of Wales, and an American journalist. In the course of the conversation, the new King expressed his disapproval of close links with France and declared a "sympathy for Germany's difficult position."[2] Furtheremore, the new King did not believe it was his duty to follow his Cabinet's decisions blindly, but to intervene if Government plans were, in his view, detrimental to British

interests. In a further conversation, recorded in an unsigned Memorandum to the German Foreign Ministry,[3] Edward VIII maintained that an urgent necessity was an alliance between Germany and Britain, including France. He asserted, furthermore, that the League of Nations was a farce. The Memorandum also included conversations with other prominent Englishment, including Eden, the Foreign Secretary; Lord Mansell, First Lord of the Admiralty; Duff Cooper, the Minister of War; Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and the Editor of The Times. All of these people, both in and out of the Cabinet, were in favour of an alliance with Germany which included France, but were particularly interested in closer relations between Britain and Germany.

On January 2, The Times called for an increase in defence expenditure.[4] The reasons for this call are complex--there was still a crisis in Abyssinia; problems in the Far East; as well as European tension. As a world power, Britain had to be prepared to face conflicts wherever they occurred in the world, and The Times felt that this must inevitably call for an increase in defence expenditure. A week later, as reported in The Times, it was feared that the economic sanctions levied against Italy might be broken by the German Government. Then, on January 17, Dr. Goebbels made a speech in which he stated that:

> Some people say that there is a world conscience which is in the League of Nations, whose part is to preserve the peace of the world, but I prefer to rely on guns.[5]

This statement caused much concern in Britain, and The Times editorialized on the subject, saying that the speech was

> . . .deliberately designed to check the growth of any sympathy for Germany in other countries, and which is hard to reconcile with the pacific professions of the more responsible leaders of the new Germany.[6]

In addition to these events, there was concern over the Free City of Danzig, and German aspirations in that direction. It was this configuration of factors--real and/or imagined--which provoked some suspicion of Germany in the British press. It was under these circumstances that Prince von Bismarck, a Counsellor at the London Embassy, reported a conversation with a member of the Foreign Office. In the course of that conversation, it was stated that the Government was aware of this atmosphere and that "the Foreign Office and the Cabinet was pursuing. . .(a policy) of cooperation as far as possible with Germany."[7]

On February 13, Harold Nicolson, a Member of Parliament and diplomatist, recorded in his diary a conversation with Eden in which the Foreign Secretary stated that his chief concern was to avert a war with Germany. To that end he was quite prepared to make large concessions to Germany on the proviso that Germany sign a disarmament treaty and join the League of Nations.[8] Shortly afterwards, Tom Jones, a leading member of the Conservative Party, wrote to a friend:

> I keep on and on and on preaching against the policy of ostracizing Germany, however incalculable Hitler and his crew may be, and the duty of resisting Vansittart's pro-French bias. . . . We have abundant evidence of the

> desire of all sorts of Germans to be on friendly terms with us. . . the moral. . . . is to put as much energy into a new economic policy for Europe as we are now putting into rearmament.[9]

By the end of February, the dominant view was that the Government ought at least to attempt a rapprochement with Germany.

On February 27, the French Parliament ratified the Franco-Soviet Security Pact, which had been signed in May, 1935. On March 5, a copy of a memorandum was sent to the German Ambassadors in Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. With it were instructions to deliver it to the Foreign Secretary of the respective countries on Saturday morning, March 7. The memorandum stated that, because of the violation of the Locarno Treaty by France--inasmuch as the Pact with Russia was ratified--Germany was reoccupying the Rhineland as of that day, March 7. Until that time, the Rhineland had been a demilitarized zone under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The memorandum further stated that now that Germany had regained full sovereignty over all its territory, it was prepared to rejoin the League of Nations. In addition, there was a seven-point peace plan. This act was not only contrary to the so-called diktat of Versailles, but also the Locarno Pact, which was a freely negotiated agreement which Hitler had endorsed in 1933 and 1934.

The first reaction was that of the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who received the German memorandum on March 7. In his memoirs, Eden states that he

> . . . deeply regretted the information which he [the Ambassador] had given me about the action the German Government was taking in the demilitarized zone. The Ambassador would understand that this amounted to the unilateral repudiation of a treaty freely negotiated and freely signed. . . . Von Hoesch repeated that the Franco-Russian Pact had . . . violated Locarno, but I answered that this view was not shared by other signators of that Treaty.

Eden went on to say he felt that the German offers in the last part of the memorandum were most important and that the British Government would consider them carefully. The German Ambassador's account of the meeting was slightly different, inasmuch as when he pointed out to Eden that the French had broken Locarno by Article 1 of the Protocol accompanying the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, Eden did not defend the clause but suggested that the correct procedure would have been to appeal to a court of arbitration.[12] This slightly different emphasis changes the tone of the meeting, and although in neither account can Eden's attitude be called conciliatory, it does seem a little more understanding in the German account. This understanding is borne out by later Cabinet documents (see infra).

The next reaction came in Tom Jones' diary entry for March 8. On the weekend of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Tom Jones was at a house party with several influential people, including Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian). The group was informed of the German moves and discussed them at some length. They welcomed Hitler's decision and regarded the breach of Versailles de minimis since that treaty was already dead. Although they

condemned the entry of troops into the demilitarized zone, it was felt an act of equality and not aggression. Finally, whilst accepting Hitler's peace plan on good faith, it was felt that rearmament should continue.[10]

By Monday, March 9, the press reacted to events of the weekend. The Times editorial that morning stated:

> Herr Hitler's invasion of the Rhineland is a challenge. . .to the voluntary agreement which has maintained the inviolability of the eastern borders of France and Belgium for the last eleven years. . . . The Locarno Agreement was in some ways ahead of its time. . . . It embodied the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which imposed demilitarization upon the German side only of the Franco-German frontier. Thus, having failed as the starting point of a process of appeasement, it survived only, in German eyes, as an additional guarantee of one of the 'inequalities' in which the Nazi movement of resurgence and revolt had its birth. . . .
>
> Herr Hitler has endeavoured to give to his default, flagrant and indefensible in itself, a constructive political implication. . . .
>
> The old structure of European peace, one-sided and unbalanced, is nearly in ruins. It is the moment, not to despair, but to rebuild.[13]

The Daily Mirror carried the banner headline, "It must not be war," and went on in its leader to say:

> Germany has flung a challenge to Europe that can lead to another great war - or a strong and lasting peace. IT MUST NOT LEAD TO WAR. . . . Serious as this violation of the Locarno Pact (which Germany signed voluntarily) and the Peace Treaty, it is in itself no threat to the peace of Europe. The offer Hitler made of twenty-five-year peace pacts with his neighbours is one that should receive very thorough examination.[14]

The Daily Herald, the Labour Party newspaper, urged that the opportunity presented by Hitler's offers should be accepted and stated:

> Either we negotiate a new settlement. . . or we deliberately begin a new war in order to prevent German troops from garrisoning German towns. . . .
>
> War is out of the question. And that being so, wisdom requires that when the League Council meets it shall devote itself, not to recrimination and useless snarling, but to the constructive task of making, with this as the opportunity, a new, more equitable, and therefore, more lasting settlement.[15]

The News Chronicle, following the trend of the other newspapers, insisted, too, that "Herr Hitler's invitation must be taken up without delay."[16] In the Daily Sketch, Herbert Sidebottom, a political commentator who also wrote for the Sunday Times and Daily Telegraph, wrote under the nom de plume, "Candidus" that "Herr Hitler should be taken at his word."[17] The diplomatic correspondent of the same newspaper stated:

> . . . the realistic view is that advantage should be taken of this German offer. It is suggested that it is best to blink at a breach which may pave the way to more cordial international relations.[18]

The general response from the British press was, then, to try to construct a better, more lasting, peace out of the ruins of Locarno and Versailles. The Rhineland was, after all, part of German territory, and was, as one newspaper put it, to Germany what Sussex was to England--[19]that is to say an integral part. Whilst there was a general sympathy for the French position, there was also a general sympathy for that of Germany, even if there was not an absolute trust of Germany in all cases.

At 11 a.m., March 9, the Cabinet met in London. The first subject discussed was the statement to be read by Eden that afternoon in the House of Commons. The statement briefly

outlined the events of the previous few days and then commented on the Government's position. Eden made it clear that no independent action could be considered and that the League of Nations was the proper place for further discussion. He condemned Germany's repudiation of Locarno but went on to add that "there is. . . no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities."[20] Finally, Eden echoed The Times in urging the importance of rebuilding a framework for peace in Europe. The general feeling in the House of Commons after that statement was largely sympathetic towards Germany.[21]

The next day, The Times urged that Britain must seize the opportunity presented by Germany's action.[22] Candidus, in the Daily Sketch, said: "I see in Herr Hitler's proposals a chance that the spectre of war can be banished from Central Europe for at least twenty-five years."[23] On the same day, the News Chronicle carried a survey taken the day before. Although not really statistically sound because the sampling was so small--only sixteen people--it did include a fair cross-section of society and is at least indicative of the views held by the general public. Only one person in the survey wanted strong action against Germany and of the rest, whilst four showed a slight distrust of Hitler, everyone thought that the move should not lead to war and eight were totally in agreement with Hitler's action.[24] The Daily Mirror's editorial for that day called for Britain to bring France and Germany together and "strive for the reconciliation of the two great nations whose unending quarrel may at last ruin civilization."[25]

At the next Cabinet meeting, which was held on March 11, the emphasis was on a peaceful solution. There was a report on a meeting of the Locarno powers that had been held on the night before, in Paris, in which the British representatives had strongly urged the necessity of a peaceful solution. It was also pointed out that British public opinion was largely sympathetic to Germany. Much time was given to the consideration of how to restrain the French and how to find a solution that was acceptable to both the French and the Germans. To this end, Eden was to see the German Ambassador that evening in the hope of getting some assurance of Germany's good intentions and to emphasize the need to obtain a peaceful settlement.[26]

The two voices that came out decidedly against Germany were those of Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. In a series of speeches in March, Churchill decried Britain's lack of preparedness as opposed to Germany's, and, in his history of the Second World War, placed much of the blame for Germany's resurgent position upon British inaction.[27] Sir Austen Chamberlain made a speech in Cambridge in which he expressed the view that German assurances of peace, in the form of the seven-point peace plan, were not to be trusted.[28] These, however, are the only two prominent voices that came out against Germany.

On March 10, the German Ambassador to London sent a communication to Berlin in which he outlined British reaction to the German moves. Whilst he noted the generally sympathetic attitude in Britain, he also added a warning note:

> The overall picture. . . . recalls. . . in certain respects the situation as it was in July, 1914. Then, too, public opinion was at first much inclined to the Central Powers. . . . When the storm clouds gathered menacingly, however, the picture quickly changed, and then transformed itself with astonishing speed into its exact opposite. . . . a sympathetic attitude on the part of public opinion is no absolutely reliable insurance. But it does constitute a valuable basis upon which a Government, determined to be moderate and reasonable, could pursue and implement a policy of reconciliation, unhampered by internal difficulties.[29]

Not only was the Government wholly in favour of being "moderate and reasonable," but the King was exerting pressure on his ministers to do so. A German journalist in London, Paul Scheffer, communicated the following to the German Foreign Ministry:

> The King is taking an extraordinarily active part in the whole affair; he has caused a number of important people in the Government to come and see him. . . . The King won't hear of there being a danger of war. He is absolutely convinced that what must now be done is to get over the 'breach of law' as quickly as possible and get on to the practical discussion of the Fuhrer and Chancellor's proposals. In view of the tremendous influence possessed by the King and his immense energy, due importance must be attached to this where Germany is concerned.[30]

Talks continued throughout March, in order to try to reach some kind of compromise acceptable to France and Belgium, as well as Germany. There was, however, no agreement reached and a stalemate ensued. The stalemate was broken, after a fashion, when the Council of the League of Nations met in London, on March 24, and a resolution adopted. The resolution contained three broad and nebulous proposals: first, action on the part of the Council was to be held in abeyance in view of the talks going on; secondly, the Governments of the

Locarno powers were invited to keep the Council informed of any progress that was made; and thirdly, the Council was to meet again to consider the question further as circumstances made it desirable.[31] This resolution effectively killed a general discussion of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland and the seven-point peace plan, although the British Government, which was largely responsible for pushing the resolution through the League Council, did continue to try to find an equitable solution to the problem. Meanwhile, the crisis in Abyssinia still was a cause for concern in Europe and dominated the next meetings of the League Council.

When the British Government tried to reopen the question in May by sending Germany a questionnaire in order to clarify certain points, it was met with no response, and despite repeated attempts to elicit some reply from Hitler, he delayed answering. Thus, when final attempts were made to reopen negotiations, in September, little progress was made; the problem was dropped, and the status quo accepted.

Throughout the crisis, the British attitude was one of conciliation and accommodation. It was also, probably, the culmination of British attempts to willingly appease Germany. After this time, the word appeasement seems to take on a different meaning and Britain's attitude is not always so willingly conciliatory.

VI

It has already been stated that, due to its geo-political position, there is a continuity to British foreign policy. Being an off-shore island with a limited amount of natural resources, Britain has always been dependent upon international trade and it was this dependence which led Britain to favour the status quo or at least non-revolutionary change as being the most conducive international atmosphere in which to fulfill its commitments. It has also been counter to British interests to allow an hegemony to establish itself on the continent since it would not only be a threat to internal independence, but also one to external interests. Thus, another British interest has been the balance of power, whereby no single nation or configuration of nations was allowed to achieve a position of strength which would threaten the interests and independence of other nations.

After the First World War, it was in British interests to restore the international status quo and peaceful trade amongst the nations. Europe in 1919, however, was a very different place from Europe in 1914. First, because the balance of power, and the alliance system which it engendered, was discredited by the war, the system of collective security which President Wilson proposed was readily accepted. The success or failure of the League of Nations is not the concern of this analysis, but the existence of the League did alter the

international situation somewhat. Secondly, Russia had become the first Communist nation and its very existence altered the international scene. Despite these changes, Britain's foreign policy itself changed little and can be summed up in general terms.

> . . . Britain's general interest was peace; that she had no territorial ambitions on the continent of Europe; . . . she would fight, nevertheless, to prevent any power from establishing hegemony over the rest of Europe; . . . she would also fight to defend her dominions, colonies, dependencies, and communications of the British Empire; . . . that she would not fight any power merely because she disliked its domestic policy and methods of internal government.[1]

In addition to the desire for peace, there was a strong desire to return to economic stability and prosperity. It was recognized that to ensure this, Communist Russia had to be accommodated and that Germany must be returned to the comity of nations. In several speeches in the Houses of Parliament, the idea was expressed that the recovery of Europe was dependent upon the recovery and participation of Russia and Germany.[2] The two fundamental ideas in British foreign policy during the inter-war years, then, were peace and international stability.

It was within the general framework of peace and economic stability that Britain shaped its attitude toward Germany. The basic feeling was that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair and wrong-headed. Although, in 1933, it was claimed in an editorial in The Times (quoted supra) that the peace treaties were essentially fair and that those people who felt

otherwise were a small minority, by 1934 that newspaper had reversed itself and was maintaining that certain portions of the treaties were unfair and should be revised. Intrinsic to the idea that Germany should be returned to its full status as a nation state was the idea that certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles should be changed or completely abolished.

Britain was, throughout the 1920's and early 1930's, on the whole sympathetic to German claims of revision of the Treaty of Versailles. During the 1920's, this concerned the revision of reparations schedules and the problem of disarmament. There were, however, problems more fundamental to Germany's status as a nation state. The fact Germany did not have full sovereignty over all its territory or the means to defend its land was always a problem, but it did not come to the fore until the mid-1930's. These were problems that were not as easy for the old allies to face, especially since France and Belgium felt threatened by a renascent Germany. With the acceptance of equality of armaments, in 1932, part of the problem was solved--at least until Germany made that concept a fact. The question of full sovereignty over all German lands was solved with the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936. In both cases, Britain reacted more or less favourably.

The advent of Hitler's Nazi regime in 1933 changed the scenario in Central Europe. The strong criticism of Germany in the British press early in 1933 was largely due to the domestic policies of the regime. Whilst it is fair to say that many people in Britain found the persecutions of the Jews and liberals

and the censorship of the press abhorrent, the British Government recognized that this was an internal problem in which it could not get involved. In addition, at the same time that there was a general outcry in Britain against the domestic situation in Germany, the British Government was negotiating a trade agreement with the Nazi Government. By the end of 1933, also, the government in Germany had stopped the more violent persecutions and the problem defused itself.

The rise of a violently nationalistic Germany, however, did cause some concern in Britain. Winston Churchill and Austen Chamberlain led the opposition to the appeasement of Germany, and by 1935 it was recognized that Germany was a potential threat to European peace. The increase in defence spending in that year was an effort to prepare Britain for the eventuality that other means to accommodate German demands failed. There is, then, a certain ambiguity in the British attitude toward Germany. On the one hand, it was recognized that Germany could pose a threat to peace; on the other hand, means were sought to conciliate Germany. It was felt that it was better to include Germany in the international community and thus exercise a limited control over it, than to have it outside the community and thus, subject to no control. The Naval Agreement of 1935 and the proposed Air Pact and Eastern Locarno were an attempt to draw Germany into a system of agreements that would avert war. The hope after the re-occupation of the Rhineland was that the system of agreements would be extended to a system of bilateral agreements between

Germany and its neighbours guaranteeing frontiers, thereby further ensuring peace.

The sympathy of the British Government with German demands found a different expression outside Government circles. That sympathy lay more in the acceptance of some "system of rights" possessed by a nation state than an attempt to control Germany. This attitude is probably best exemplified by a comment made to Eden by a taxidriver on the re-occupation of the Rhineland: "I suppose Jerry [the Germans] can do what they like in his own back garden, can't he?"[3] This attitude is typical, then, of the wider reaction to German foreign policy, which appears in a more sophisticated form in the press and Parliament.

D. C. Wall, in his book Personalities and Policies[4] states that British foreign policy toward Germany was formulated before the Nazis and the character of the Nazi regime were established. This assertion (echoed by Gatzke in his book[5]) is clearly true since the British attitude in the 1930's was largely a continuation of that of the 1920's. By 1935, however, when the character of the Nazi regime was clear, there were still further attempts to accommodate the Nazi Government whilst preparing for other eventualities.

Other than the aberrant influence of German domestic policy, the British were sympathetic toward Germany and continued to be so as long as the fundamental aims of peace and economic stability could be served by it. When there was a threat of a German hegemony in Europe, that sympathy changed drastically.

NOTES

I

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[3]Ibid., p. 1, see also F. S. Northedge, (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Powers (New York: Praeger, 1963).

[4]Watt, ibid., p. 1.

[5]R. R. James, (ed.), Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson Memoirs and Papers 1910-1937 (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 398.

[6]Northedge, op. cit., pp. 157-8.

[7]See Watt, op. cit., pp. 10-13.

[8]Ibid., p. 13 and note 3.

[9]Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series C (Washington: The State Department, 1957) IV: 1062; and James and Suzanne Pool, Who Financed Hitler? (New York: The Daily Press, 1978), pp. 317-19.

[10]See particularly Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1:92-5.

[11]Ibid., p. 94.

[12]Watt, op. cit., p. 11.

[13]The History of The Times, IV:905, as quoted in F. R. Gannon, The British Press and Germany 1936-1939 (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1971), p. 63.

[14]Gannon, ibid., p. 64.

[15]Dawson to Winn, October 5, 1938, The Times archives as quoted ibid., p. 67. Although this letter was written in 1938, it does seem a fair summary of The Times' attitude from 1933 onward.

[16]Ibid., p. 78.

[17]Crozier, March 12, 1935, Manchester Guardian Archives, quoted ibid., pp. 78-9.

[18]Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1:75-77.

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[24]R. R. James, op. cit..

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[26]Sir Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962).

[27]Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Second Series, 6 vols. (London: H. M. S. O., 1948).

[28]See, for example, R. A. Butler, The Art of the Possible (Ipswich, Mass.: Gambit, 1972).

[29]D. C. Watt, "Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School?", Political Quarterly (London: Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1965), 36:191.

[30]Ibid., pp. 199-206.

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[2]Speech by the Marquess of Curzon as reported in The Times (London), November 9, 1922, p. 14.

[3]Speech by Herbert Asquith in the House of Commons, February 13, 1923 quoted in Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940), p. 244.

[4]E. H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 97.

[5]Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Second Series, 6. vols. (London: H. M. S. O., 1948), III:22.

[6]Ibid., pp. 16-22.

[7]Speech by Ramsey MacDonald as reported in The Times (London), July 13, 1932, p. 7.

[8]See The Times (London), July 12, 1932, p. 15 et.seq..

[9]Documents on British Foreign Policy, IV:547.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid. p. 337.

[13]Cab. 23/70, 19(32).

[14]C. R. Atlee, As It Happened (New York: Viking Press, 1954), p. 136.

[15]R. R. James, (ed.), Winston Churchill, His Complete Speeches (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), V:5193-5.

[16]Ibid., p. 5199.

[17]See W. N. Medlicott, "The Coming of War in 1939", in W. N. Medlicott, (ed.), From Metternich to Hitler: Aspects of British and Foreign History 1814-1939 (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1963), p. 234; and Hans W. Gatzke, (ed.), European Diplomacy Between Two Wars, 1919-1939 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 127.

[18]Documents on British Foreign Policy, IV:398-400.

[19]The Times (London), January 31, 1933, p. 11.

[20]The Economist (London), February 4, 1933, pp. 224-225.

[21]Dr. A. Flexner, first director of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1930-1939, to Tom Jones, Februaru 27, 1933, in T. Jones, Diary with Letters, 1931-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 95.

[22]Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 68-71.

[23]Documents on British Foreign Policy, IV:410.

[24]The Times (London), February 17, 1933, p. 13.

[25]Ibid.

[26]The Economist (London), February 18, 1933, p. 343.

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[28]The Times (London), February 23, 1933, p. 13.

[29]The Times (London), March 1, 1933, p. 13.

[30]Documents on British Foreign Policy, IV:431-433.

[31]The Times (London), March 2, 1933, p. 7.

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[33]Ibid., pp. 441-451.

[34]The Times (London), March 7, 1933, p. 15

[35]Documents on British Foreign Policy, IV:417.

[36]The Times (London), March 11, 1933, p. 11.

[37]Speech reported in The Times (London), March 13, 1933, p. 16.

[38]Documents on British Foreign Policy, V:5.

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[40]Speech reported in The Times (London), April 29, 1933, p. 15.

[41]Speech reported in The Times (London), May 2, 1933, p. 8.

[42]Documents on British Foreign Policy, V:67, Enclosure B [1] in No. 44.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., pp. 70-98.

[45]Speech reported in The Times (London), April 15, 1933, p. 5.

[46]Ibid.

[47]The Times (London), April 29, 1933, p. 15.

[48]Documents on British Foreign Policy, V:326-327.

[49]Enid Bagnold, "The New Revivalism", in The Times (London), June 2, 1933, pp. 15-16.

[50]Documents on British Foreign Policy, V:350.

[51]The Times (London), June 7, 1933, p. 13.

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[53]Ibid., p. 760.

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[56]The Times (London), October 15, 1933, p. 13.

[57]See The Times (London), November 13, 1933, p. 13; and November 14, 1933, p. 15.

[58]The Times (London), November 14, 1933, p. 15.

[59]The Times (London), September 27, 1933, p. 9.

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[2]Ibid., p. 314-324.

[3]Ibid., p. 316.

[4]Ibid., p. 375.

[5]The Times (London), January 30, 1934, p. 15.

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[9]Ibid., pp. 365-366.

[10]Ibid., p. 366, note 4.

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[13]James, op. cit., pp. 5342-5344.

[14]The Times (London), March 23, 1934, p. 13.

[15]Cab 23/78, 10(34). Meeting held March 19, 1934.

[16]Documents on British Foreign Policy, IV:600-614.

[17]Ibid., Appendix III, VI:975.

[18]Ibid., VI:989-990.

[19]Harold Nicholson King George V (London: Constable and Co., 1952) pp. 521-522.

[20]The Times (London), July 3, 1934, p. 15.

[21]Sir John Simon, as quoted in W. D. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919-1963 (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 134.

[22]Documents on German Foreign Policy (Washington: The State Department, 1959), II:614-616.

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[24]As quoted in James W. Gautenbein, (ed.), Documentary Background of World War II, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 348-350.

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[2]Ibid.

[3]The Times (London), January 16, 1935, p. 15.

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[16]The Times (London), June 14,1935, p. 15.

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[18]Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London: Collins, 1954), as quoted in J. A. Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, A Political Biography (London: Jonathon Cape, 1977), p. 192.

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[2]Ibid., p. 1017.

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[5]The Times (London), January 20, 1936, p. 13.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Documents on German Foreign Policy, IV:1137.

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[15]Daily Herald (London), March 9, 1936, p. 10.

[16]News Chronicle (London), March 9, 1936, p. 11.

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[20]Cab 23/83, 16(36). Appendix II, meeting held March 9, 1936.

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